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Abstract 
 
Despite the longstanding insider trading debate, there is little empirical research on 
insider trading laws, especially in a comparative context.  The article attempts to fill that 
gap.  I find that countries with more prohibitive insider trading laws have more diffuse 
equity ownership, more accurate stock prices, and more liquid stock markets.  These 
findings are generally robust to controlling for measures of disclosure and enforceability 
and suggest that formal insider trading laws (especially their deterrent components) 
matter to stock market development.  The article suggests further avenues of empirical 
research on the specific mechanisms through which insider trading laws might matter and 
the political economy of their adoption. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The law and economics debate about insider trading (that is, trading by corporate insiders 
or their associates on the basis of price-sensitive, private information) is both long-standing and 
inconclusive.
1  Scholars on one side of the debate argue that insider trading is efficient and 
public regulation is inefficient (see, e.g., Carlton and Fischel, 1983; Manne, 1966), while 
scholars on the other side of the debate argue the opposite (see, e.g., Cox, 1986; 
Georgakopoulos, 1993; Kraakman, 1991).  Although the “desirability of [regulating] insider 
trading is ultimately an empirical question” (Carlton and Fischel, 1983, p. 866), the insider 
trading debate thus far has been largely theoretical.  It has also implicitly assumed background 
securities markets and corporate governance institutions like those of the United States and 
Canada.  However, recent studies in comparative corporate and securities law and finance 
suggest that the implications of these laws vary systematically with economic, legal, institutional 
and even social differences across countries.  The aim of the article is therefore to conduct an 
exploratory empirical analysis of the relationship between insider trading laws and financial 
structure and performance across countries. 
The article is complementary to Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002).  That study addresses 
the effect of the initial enactment and enforcement of insider trading laws on the cost of equity 
capital.
2  Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) track 51 countries for over more than 20 years; thus, 
they have a large sample size and high statistical power.  However, their insider trading law 
variables are fairly rudimentary, because they measure only whether an insider trading 
prohibition exists and whether, if it exists, the prohibition has been enforced once.  Nevertheless, 
such measures are sufficient for their main inquiry, which is the impact of a regime shift from no 
insider trading prohibition/enforcement to insider trading prohibition/enforcement on the cost of 
equity.  In contrast, my inquiry is whether differences in specific legal elements of countries’ 
insider trading laws are associated with differences in the structure and performance of their 
stock markets.  To address this question, I focus on the aspects of countries’ insider trading laws 
that I believe, a priori, to be substantively meaningful from a legal and economic perspective,
3 
                                                 
1   See Bainbridge (1999) for a thorough summary of the issues in the debate. 
2    The major finding of that study is that the cost of equity in a country falls by about 5% upon the first 
prosecution of that country’s insider trading prohibition, while the enactment of the prohibition has no effect on the 
cost of equity.   
3   Several subsequent studies utilizing the measures of insider trading law developed in this paper confirm the 
economic significance of these measures (Bris, 2003; Durnev and Nain, 2004; Herrington, 2004).  
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with an emphasis on deterrence.  It is thus appropriate to view Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) 
and this article in a complementary light. 
Using financial, legal, and institutional data from a cross-section of 33 countries, I find 
that countries with more prohibitive insider trading laws generally have more dispersed equity 
ownership, more informative stock prices, and more liquid stock markets.  These preliminary 
findings suggest that formal insider trading laws (especially their deterrent elements) matter to 
stock market development.  The specific mechanisms through which formal insider trading laws 
might matter and the political economy of their adoption merit further empirical study. 
The article is organized as follows.  Part II briefly summarizes existing theories of insider 
trading/regulation and presents three testable hypotheses.  In Part III, I describe the data and 
present univariate statistics.  Part IV presents and discusses the regression results.  Finally, Part 
V concludes and suggests promising avenues for future research. 
II.  THEORIES OF INSIDER TRADING AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
A.  Insider Trading Regulation and Ownership Concentration 
Regardless of whether insider trading is harmful or beneficial, there are several reasons 
why insider trading (or lax insider trading laws) might be associated with greater ownership 
concentration.  First, insider trading might create adverse selection problems (Manove, 1989).  If 
outsiders are sophisticated, they will simply discount the price that they are willing to pay for the 
firm’s shares to account for adverse selection from insider trading (Manove, 1989).  If outsiders 
are unsophisticated, however, they might refrain altogether from purchasing shares when insider 
trading rules are weak or nonexistent, thus hindering dispersed share ownership (Ausubel, 1990).  
Second, insider trading might exacerbate agency problems within the firm (see, e.g., Bebchuk 
and Fershtman, 1990; Haft, 1982; Maug, 2002) and therefore discourage outside investment (La 
Porta et al., 1997, 1998).   
Finally, even if insider trading is beneficial, it might still foster concentrated ownership.  
Large shareholders often play a valuable monitoring role (see, e.g., Bhide, 1993; Demsetz, 1986; 
Shelifer and Vishny, 1986).  However, they must be compensated for that and for the risks 
associated with holding undiversified portfolios.  A potential compensation mechanism is insider 
trading (Bhide, 1993; Demsetz, 1986).  Permitting insider trading might therefore encourage 
large shareholding by active investors, while legally prohibiting insider trading might have the 
opposite effect (Bhide, 1993; Demsetz, 1986).  For the foregoing reasons, countries seeking to  
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promote widespread equity ownership might consider prohibiting insider trading. 
B.  Insider Trading Regulation and Stock Price Informativeness 
One of the most contentious issues in the insider trading debate is whether insider trading 
makes stock prices more or less informative (see, e.g., Kraakman, 1991; Manne, 1966).
4  On the 
one hand, insider trading might make a stock’s price more informative by moving it more 
quickly to the firm’s true value (Carlton and Fischel, 1983; Manne, 1966).
5  On the other hand, 
insider trading could pervert corporate insiders’ incentives to release information to the market, 
making stock prices less informative (Benabou and Laroque, 1992; Kraakman, 1991).  Another 
way in which insider trading might make stock prices less informative is by reducing (outside) 
informed traders’ incentives to uncover firm-specific information
6 by: (1) increasing the risk of 
expropriation by corporate insiders (Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000); and/or by (2) reducing 
competition in the market for information (Fishman and Hagerty, 1992; Georgakopoulos, 1993; 
Goshen and Parchomovsky, 2001).
7   
C.  Insider Trading Regulation and Stock Market Liquidity 
A final important issue in the insider trading debate is the effect of insider trading on 
stock market liquidity (see, e.g., Carlton and Fischel, 1983; Georgeakopoulos, 1993; Goshen and 
Parchomovsky, 2001; Haddock and Macey, 1986b, 1987).  Finance scholars generally agree that 
information asymmetry can compromise liquidity (see, e.g., Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten 
and Harris, 1988; Leland,1992).
8  In Copeland and Galai (1983), for example, dealers subsidize 
their trading losses vis-a-vis informed traders by charging liquidity traders an immediacy fee (the 
bid-ask spread), which increases in the degree of information asymmetry.
9  Since insider trading 
exacerbates information asymmetry, it should raise trading costs (Fishman and Hagerty, 1992; 
Georgakopolous, 1993; Shin, 1996).  In turn, greater trading costs imply lower stock market 
                                                 
4   This is an important issue because more informative stock prices lead to a more efficient allocation of capital in 
the economy (Wurgler, 2000).   
5   Manne (1966) and Carlton and Fischel (1983) argue that insider trading is less expensive than traditional means 
of information disclosure. 
6   The collective trading of informed traders leads to more efficient capitalization of firm-specific information into 
stock prices (see, e.g., French and Roll, 1986; Goshen and Parchomovsky, 2001; Grossman, 1976; Morck, Yeung, 
and Yu, 2000; Roll, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).   
7  Consistent with this, Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004) find that analyst following increases after countries’ 
initial enforcement of insider trading laws. 
8   This work builds on Akerlof’s (1970) original insight that markets malfunction in the presence of asymmetric 
information and, in extreme cases, may break down entirely. 
9  Stoll (1989) finds that 43% of the bid-ask spread of NASDAQ/National Market System stocks is due to adverse 
information costs.  
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liquidity. 
D.  Testable Hypotheses 
The preceding discussion suggests the following testable hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1 (“H1”):  More prohibitive insider trading laws are associated with 
greater ownership dispersion.    
Hypothesis 2 (“H2”):  More prohibitive insider trading laws are associated with 
more informative stock prices. 
Hypothesis 3 (“H3”):  More prohibitive insider trading laws are associated with 
greater stock market liquidity.   
III.  THE VARIABLES AND UNIVRIATE STATISTICS 
The initial sample consists of a cross-section of 33 countries.  The countries vary along 
several important dimensions, including the efficiency, transparency and regulation of their stock 
markets, their corporate laws and corporate governance structures, their legal traditions, and the 
quality of their law enforcement and other institutions. 
A.  The Variables 
1.  The Dependent Variables 
Hypotheses 1-3 require measures of ownership dispersion, stock price informativeness, 
and stock market liquidity. These data come from several sources.  First, ownership data come 
from La Porta et al. (1998).  They define ownership concentration as the average ownership 
concentration of the three largest shareholders in the ten largest private non-financial firms in the 
economy.  I define ownership dispersion as one minus La Porta et al.’s (1998) ownership 
concentration measure.  Thus defined, ownership dispersion is the average fraction of shares 
owned by all shareholders except the three largest shareholders in the ten largest private non-
financial firms in the economy.   
Second, Morck, Yeung, and Yu’s (2000) measure of stock price synchronicity is my 
measure of stock price informativeness.  This variable measures the degree to which the stock 
prices of different firms moved together in an average week in 1995.  Greater synchronicity (co-
movement) of stock returns implies that a larger proportion of stock return variation is explained 
by market-wide than by firm-specific factors, suggesting that stock prices are less informative.   
Information on stock market liquidity comes from the International Finance 
Corporation’s (IFC) Emerging Stock Markets Factbook (1996).  The IFC reports stock market  
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turnover, a common measure of liquidity, which is the ratio of the total value traded to total stock 
market capitalization.  I use the IFC’s turnover data for the sample countries for 1995.  Table 1 
describes the dependent variables. 
2.  Insider Trading Regulation and Enforcement 
a.  Insider Trading Laws 
Since most countries with stock exchanges (and all of the countries in my sample) forbid 
corporate insiders to trade on the basis of price-sensitive, private information, I do not code this 
basic restriction.
10   Rather, I code four additional elements of countries’ insider trading laws as 
they existed as of the mid-1990s (Gaillard, 1992; Stamp and Welsh, 1996) on the basis of a priori 
reasoning about which elements of insider trading laws are substantively significant, with an 
emphasis on deterrence.
11    
The first element, Tipping, equals one if a corporate insider is liable for giving price-
sensitive, private information to an outsider (so-called “tippee”
 12) and encouraging her to trade, 
and zero otherwise.  Forbidding a corporate insider to trade on inside information but at the same 
time allowing her to tip outsiders who subsequently trade is equivalent to allowing the insider to 
trade on her own behalf.
13  The second element, Tippee, equals one if tippees, like corporate 
insiders, are forbidden to trade on price-sensitive, private information, and zero otherwise.
14  The 
third element, Damages, equals one if the potential monetary penalty for violating a country’s 
                                                 
10   Price-sensitive information is generally defined as information that would significantly affect the stock’s price.  
The standards for determining whether information is price-sensitive vary across countries and contexts, as 
Euronext, the pan-European Exchange, notes: “Whether or not information is price sensitive depends on factors 
specific to each individual company, such as its size, recent history and sector of activity.  Market sentiment can also 
have a marked effect on price sensitivity.  Given these considerations, it is not possible to produce one definition of 
price sensitivity that takes all of these factors into account.  For the same reason, it is impossible to indicate what 
percentage increase or decrease in a share price qualifies as a ‘significant impact’ on prices” 
<http://www.euronext.com/vgn/images/portal/cit_53424/55/32/66175905901789_OA1_Price-sens.pdf>.  Therefore, 
I do not code price-sensitivity (materiality) standards because to do so would require subjective judgments.  I avoid 
coding scienter requirements and fiduciary standards for the same reason.  At any rate, the requirement of a 
fiduciary nexus between the source of the information and the person engaging in insider trading is virtually unique 
to common law countries, and particularly the United States (see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).  I 
do not code the misappropriation theory of liability (see United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997)) either, for 
simplicity.  Herrington (2004) does, however. 
11   Bainbridge (1999), Brudney (1979), Clark (1986), and Kraakman (1991) provide excellent overviews of the 
legal doctrinal issues. 
12   A tippee is an outsider who has received a “heads-up” (or tip) about price-sensitive, private information by a 
corporate insider (a director, manager, employee, advisor, etc.).   
13    As Brudney (1979) notes, “the insider, by giving the information out selectively, is in effect selling the 
information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal information, or other things of value for himself, including possibly 
prestige or status or the like (p. 348).”  
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insider trading law is greater than the illicit insider trading profits, and zero otherwise.  If the 
potential monetary penalty is less than the profits from insider trading, the insider trading law’s 
deterrent effect is weaker, holding constant the probability of detection.
15  Finally, the fourth 
element, Criminal, equals one if insider trading is a criminal offense in the country, and zero 
otherwise.  In some cases, criminal  sanctions might yield more efficient deterrence than 
monetary sanctions (Polinksy and Shavell, 2000).
16   
A country’s insider trading prohibition can be characterized along two broad (although 
not exhaustive) dimensions: the scope of the activities that it prohibits and the sanctions for 
violating it.  I thus create two sub-indices of insider trading law, which correspond roughly to 
these separate aspects.  The first sub-index, Scope, is the sum of Tipping and Tippee.  The insider 
trading prohibition is broader if it prohibits insiders both from trading and from tipping third 
parties.  It is broader still if it also forbids tippees to trade.  The second sub-index, Sanction, is 
the sum of Damages and Criminal and is a rough proxy for the expected cost of violating a 
country’s insider trading laws.  A potential violator will compare the expected benefit to the 
expected cost of breaking the law (see, e.g., Becker, 1968; Polinsky and Shavell, 2000).  Holding 
constant the expected benefit, the greater the expected cost, the greater is the law’s deterrent 
effect.
17   
I also create an aggregate insider trading law index, IT Law, which is the sum of the two 
sub-indices,  Scope  and  Sanction.  Abstracting from enforcement, an IT Law score of zero 
represents the most lax insider trading regime, while an IT Law score of four represents the most 
                                                                                                                                                             
14   “[R]eceipt of the information by one who is such a selected beneficiary taints the recipient so that he should no 
more be entitled to use it in trading than was the donor” (Id.). 
15  Of course, the probability of detection is not constant; some countries have better detection technology than 
others.  When the probability of detection is very low, the monetary penalty must be greater for efficient deterrence 
(Dooley, 1980; Easterbrook, 1985; Polinsky and Shavell, 2000).  In fact, very high monetary sanctions might be 
desirable if they accommodate low detection probabilities and thus economize on enforcement costs (Polinsky and 
Shavell, 2000).  In the context of shareholder litigation, Dooley (1980) discusses several negative effects of limiting 
recovery to insider trading profits. 
16   One case is where the likelihood of detection is very low and the optimal monetary penalty is thus greater than 
the violator’s net wealth.  In such a case, criminal prosecution leading to imprisonment or other non-monetary 
sanctions might yield optimal deterrence (Easterbrook, 1985).  Criminal sanctions might also have the opposite 
effect, however, since in most jurisdictions criminal prosecution requires a higher standard of proof.  A higher 
burden of proof reduces the probability of success of prosecution and increases enforcement costs.  This should 
reduce the likelihood of finding a statistically significant coefficient on Criminal. 
17   Since I do not have data on the expected benefits of violating insider trading laws, my analysis implicitly 
assumes that they are constant within and across countries.  In reality, insider trading profits vary systematically 
with legal and institutional differences across countries and the context within which such trading occurs (see, e.g., 
Bris 2003; Durnev and Nain, 2004).  
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prohibitive insider trading regime.  Each of the insider trading law variables is described in Table 
1. 
b. Enforceability   
Enacting insider trading laws is merely the first step.  The deterrent effect of such laws 
also depends on the probability (actual or perceived) that they will be enforced (see, e.g., 
Zimring and Hawkins, 1973).  In this regard, two dimensions of enforcement are relevant: actual 
(or past) enforcement and enforcement power (or potential), both of which theoretically should 
figure in the costs of potential transgressors’ calculus.   
Although there is little systematic information on actual enforcement or enforcement 
power across countries, a few rough proxies exist.  For actual enforcement, I use information on 
countries’ enforcement histories from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002).  Their enforcement 
information consists of the year in which a country enforced its insider trading rules for the first 
time.  I convert this information into the variable Enforced by 1994, which equals one if a 
country had enforced its insider trading rules for the first time by 1994 and zero otherwise.
18   
For enforcement power, I construct two separate measures: public enforcement power 
and private enforcement power.  My division of enforcement power into public and private 
dimensions is inspired by the theoretical inquiry about who should enforce a particular public 
law (see, e.g., Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer, 2001; Hay and Shleifer, 1998; Landis, 1938; La 
Porta et al., 2003; Shavell and Polinksy, 2000).
19  To construct public enforcement power, I rely 
on securities regulatory information compiled by La Porta et al. (2003) based on a survey of 
domestic lawyers concerning, among other things, the attributes and investigative powers of the 
                                                 
18   I choose 1994 as the cut-off date because the dependent variables come from around the period 1995-1996 and 
because the insider trading law indices are based on the sample countries’ insider trading rules as they existed 
around the same period.  Both the content and the enforcement of these laws might have changed in many of these 
countries since 1994.  See Herrington (2004) for more recent measures of insider trading rules and enforcement 
across countries. 
19   La Porta et al. (2003) address the relative advantages and disadvantages of private and public enforcement of 
securities laws.  Under their public enforcement hypothesis, “[p]ublic enforcement might work because the enforcer 
is independent and focused and so can regulate markets free from political interference, because the enforcer can 
introduce regulations of market participants, because it can secure information from issuers and market participants 
– through subpoena, discovery, or other means – more effectively than private plaintiffs, or because it can impose 
sanctions” (p. 4).  Under their private enforcement hypothesis, the main, “benefit of the securities law is the direct 
reduction in the costs of private contracting [since] the law can structure contracting and litigation by explicitly 
describing the obligations of various parties and burdens of proof, thereby reducing the costs to them and to the 
court of establishing liability” (pp. 3-4).     
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securities market supervisor.
20  The supervisor’s attributes include four elements that address the 
supervisor’s independence, focus and power: (1) supervisor appointment process; (2) supervisor 
tenure; (3) focus of supervisor’s activities; and (4) supervisor’s rulemaking authority.  La Porta 
et al. (2003) compute the supervisor characteristics index as the mean of these four attributes.  A 
higher mean signifies that the securities market supervisor is more independent of the political 
process and has greater authority.  La Porta et al. (2003) also construct an index of the 
supervisor’s investigative powers, which equals the mean of the supervisor’s power to command 
documents and to subpoena the testimony of witnesses during investigations of violations of the 
country’s securities laws.  Using these two measures, I create the variable Public Enforcement 
Power as the mean of La Porta et al.’s (2003) supervisor characteristics and investigative powers 
indices.  Table 1 describes Public Enforcement Power and its components in greater detail.   
To construct a measure of private enforcement power, I first consider whether investors 
may bring private suits against alleged transgressors of the country’s insider trading laws.   
Private rights to sue theoretically should increase investors’ incentives to enforce the country’s 
insider trading laws independent of any action taken by the relevant regulatory authority(ies).
21  
The variable Private Right equals one if such a right exists, and zero otherwise.  Private litigation 
is only meaningful to the extent that the judicial system is reliable and efficient, however (see, 
e.g., Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer, 2001; Hay and Shleifer, 1998).  Thus, I construct an index 
of private enforcement power, Private Enforcement Power, as the product of an index of the 
efficiency of the judiciary (La Porta et al., 2003) and Private Right.  Table 1 describes Private 
Enforcement Power and its components in greater detail. 
3. Other  Controls 
To isolate the relationship between insider trading regulation and the dependent variables, 
I control for several factors that prior research suggests are relevant to financial market structure 
and performance.  First, since economic development is generally associated with greater 
financial market development and better institutions and law enforcement capabilities (see, e.g., 
La Porta et al., 1999; North, 1981), I control for the logarithm of per capita gross domestic 
                                                 
20  I am implicitly assuming that the sample countries’ relative rankings in terms of these measures have not changed 
significantly between the mid-1990s and the time of La Porta et al.’s (2003) survey. 
21  Of course, private enforcement might be abusive or insufficient (see, e.g., Dooley, 1980; Polinsky and Shavell, 
2000).   I say more about the potential insufficiency of private enforcement in the conclusion.  
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product (GDP).
22  Second, since stock market liquidity is positively associated with economic 
growth (Atje and Jovanovic, 1993;  Levine and Zervos, 1998), I control for the growth of GDP 
per capita.  Third, I control for anti-director rights (La Porta et al., 1997) and legal origin (La 
Porta et al., 1997), since La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) demonstrate that both measures have an 
important bearing upon financial development.  Finally, I control for disclosure, since better 
disclosure is associated with greater stock market development (Francis, Khurana and Pereira, 
2003; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2003) and might reduce corporate insiders’ incentives to 
engage in insider trading (Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996; Shin, 1996).  
I use two measures of disclosure.  The first is a measure of legal disclosure requirements 
from La Porta et al. (2003).  This index, Disclosure, is an arithmetic average of 5 categories of 
information that firms are required to include in their offering prospectuses: (1) compensation; 
(2) ownership structure; (3) inside ownership; (4) irregular contracts; and (5) related party 
transactions.  The second measure is the quality of accounting standards, Accounting, which 
ranks countries on the basis of the quality of their corporate disclosure practices as of 1990 (La 
Porta et al., 1998).  Disclosure is a proxy for the strength of the involuntary disclosure regime at 
the initial offering stage, while Accounting is a proxy for the quality of periodic (post-offering) 
disclosure and measures firms’ actual disclosure practices rather than legal disclosure 
requirements per se.  Table 1 describes both disclosure variables and all of the other control 
variables in greater detail. 
4. Univariate  Statistics 
Table 2 presents the formal insider trading laws and enforcement measures for the sample 
countries, grouped by legal origin.  The only significant difference in the formal insider trading 
laws between the common law countries and the civil law countries is with respect to sanctions.  
The difference in the mean value of Sanction (the sum of Damages and Criminal) between the 
common law and civil law countries is positive and significant at the 10% level.  The common 
law countries also tend to allocate greater public and private
23 enforcement power (the 
differences in the mean values of both of these variables are significant at the 1% level).  These 
patterns are consistent with the general finding of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) that common law 
                                                 
22   Also, wealthier countries should have (access to) more advanced surveillance technologies to detect insider 
trading violations.   
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countries are more protective of investors than civil law countries.  However, there is no 
significant difference in the proportion of the common law countries that had enforced their 
insider trading laws by 1994 and the proportion of the civil law countries that had done so.   
Table 3 presents pair-wise correlation coefficients.  Consistent with H1, ownership 
dispersion is positively and significantly correlated with the aggregate IT Law index, the sub-
index Sanction, and Enforced by 1994 (the correlation coefficients have p-values of 0.01, 0.00 
and 0.00, respectively).  Ownership dispersion is not significantly correlated with either of the 
enforcement power variables, Public Enforcement Power and Private Enforcement Power, 
although the correlation coefficients are all positive, consistent with H1.  Consistent with H2, 
stock price synchronicity is negatively
24 and significantly correlated with the aggregate IT Law 
index and the sub-indices Sanction and Scope (the correlation coefficients have p-values of 0.01, 
0.04 and 0.03, respectively).  However, stock price synchronicity is not significantly correlated 
with any of the actual or enforcement power measures.  Consistent with H3, stock market 
turnover is positively correlated with the sub-index Scope and the aggregate IT Law index (the 
correlation coefficients have p-values of 0.04 and 0.03, respectively).  However, stock market 
turnover is not significantly correlated with Sanction or with any of the enforcement measures 
(column 5 and rows 7-9).   
Finally, the results in Table 3 suggest that countries whose formal insider trading laws 
penalize insider trading more harshly also tend to allocate greater enforcement powers to both 
public and private enforcers and are more likely to have actually enforced such laws. 
IV.  DO INSIDER TRADING LAWS MATTER?   
A.  Ownership Dispersion 
H1 predicts that countries with more prohibitive insider trading laws have more dispersed 
stock ownership.  Panel A of Table 4 presents the basic regressions for ownership dispersion.  
Columns 1-3 present the results using the alternative insider trading law indices and the control 
variables, excluding the disclosure variables.  The coefficient on Scope is negative and 
insignificant (column 1).  In contrast and consistent with H1, the coefficient on Sanction is 
                                                                                                                                                             
23    I thank Merritt Fox for pointing out that “countries that have a private right of action to support rules 
against insider trading probably have a quite different kind of legal system in other broader regards.”  I control for 
legal origin in the regressions, which should partially address this concern. 
24     H2 predicts a negative correlation between the stringency of insider trading laws and synchronicity because 
lower synchronicity implies that stock prices are more informative.  
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positive and significant at the 1% level (column 2).  Also consistent with H1, the coefficient on 
the aggregate index IT Law is positive and significant at the 5% level (column 3).   
In columns 4-9 in Panel A of Table 4, I regress ownership dispersion on the alternative 
insider trading law measures, the disclosure variables and the other control variables.  When I 
control for Disclosure and Accounting, the coefficient on Scope remains insignificant (columns 4 
and 5, respectively); the coefficient on Sanction remains positive and significant (columns 6 and 
7, respectively); and the coefficient on the aggregate IT Law index  remains positive and 
significant (columns 8 and 9, respectively).  The coefficients on the disclosure variables are 
generally insignificant (columns 4-9).
25  Overall, the results in Panel A of Table 4 are consistent 
with H1 and suggest that large public corporations tend to have greater ownership dispersion in 
countries whose formal insider trading laws contain greater sanctions for insider trading 
violations. 
B.  Stock Price Informativeness   
H2 predicts that stock prices are more informative in markets with more stringent insider 
trading laws.  Lower synchronicity implies more informative stock prices, so H2 predicts 
negative regression coefficients on the insider trading law variables.  Panel B of Table 4 presents 
the basic regressions for stock price synchronicity.  Columns 1-3 of Panel B regress stock price 
synchronicity on the alternative insider trading law indices and the control variables, excluding 
the disclosure variables.  Consistent with H2, the coefficient on Scope is negative and significant 
at the 5% level (column 1).  Also consistent with H2, the coefficient on Sanction is negative and 
significant at the 1% level (column 2).  Again, consistent with H2, the coefficient on the 
aggregate IT Law index is negative and significant at the 5% level (column 3). 
In columns 4-9 in Panel B of Table 4, I regress stock price synchronicity on the 
alternative insider trading law measures and the control variables, including the alternative 
disclosure variables, Disclosure and Accounting.
26  The coefficients on Scope, Sanction, and the 
                                                 
25   In unreported regressions, I regress ownership dispersion on the alternative disclosure measures and the control 
variables, excluding the insider trading law indices.  The coefficient on Disclosure is positive and significant at the 
10% level.  In contrast, although the coefficient on Accounting is positive, it is insignificant.  My finding in this 
paper that the relationship between insider trading laws and the dependent variables is generally stronger than the 
relationship between the dependent variables and disclosure is consistent with the finding of Francis, Khurana and 
Pereira (2003) that disclosure is of secondary importance to the legal rules protecting investors. 
26   In unreported regressions, I regress stock price synchronicity on the alternative disclosure measures and the 
control variables, without the insider trading law indices.  The coefficient on Disclosure is positive but insignificant, 
while the coefficient on Accounting is positive and significant at the 5% level.    
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aggregate IT Law index remain negative and significant when I control for Disclosure in each of 
columns 4-9.  The overall picture in Panel B of Table 4 is that, consistent with H2, the degree of 
informativeness of stock prices is positively associated with more prohibitive formal insider 
trading rules. 
C.  Stock Market Liquidity 
H3 predicts that countries with more prohibitive insider trading laws have more liquid 
stock markets.  Panel C of Table 4 presents the basic results.  In columns 1-3 of Panel C, I 
regress stock market turnover on the alternative insider trading law indices and the control 
variables, excluding the disclosure variables.  The coefficient on Scope is positive but 
insignificant (column 1).  Consistent with H3, the coefficients on Sanction (column 2) and the 
aggregate IT Law index (column 3) are both positive and significant at the 10% level.   
In columns 4-9 in Panel C, the regressions include the alternative insider trading law 
measures and the control variables, including the disclosure variables, Disclosure and 
Accounting.
27  The coefficient on Scope remains positive but insignificant when I control for 
Disclosure (column 4) and becomes positive and significant at the 10% level when I control for 
Accounting (column 5).  The coefficient on Sanction is still positive and significant at the 10% 
level when I control for Disclosure (column 6), but it becomes slightly less significant (p-value 
of 11%) when I control for Accounting (column 7).  The coefficient on the aggregate IT Law 
index  remains positive and significant at the 10% level when I control for Disclosure and 
Accounting (columns 8 and 9, respectively).  The results in Panel C of Table 4 suggest that, 
consistent with H3, countries with more prohibitive formal insider trading laws have more liquid 
stock markets. 
D.  Are the Basic Results Robust to the Enforcement Environment? 
Thus far, I have focused on countries’ formal insider trading laws.  However, 
enforceability might be more pivotal than the formal rules (Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer, 2000).  
Therefore, in Table 5, I control for the enforcement measures that I describe in Part III.  These 
measures should capture (at least in part) omitted institutional characteristics of the securities 
regulatory regime that might be driving the results. 
                                                 
27   In unreported regressions, I regress stock market turnover on each the alternative disclosure quality measures 
and the other control variables, excluding the insider trading law variables.  The coefficients on Disclosure and 
Accounting are both positive but insignificant.    
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Panel A of Table 5 reports the results for ownership dispersion.  Columns 1-3 include the 
alternative enforcement measures and the control variables without the insider trading law 
indices.  Only past enforcement, Enforced by 1994, is positive and significant (at the 5% level, 
column 1), implying that ownership is more dispersed in countries that have enforced their 
insider trading laws in the past.  In contrast, neither Public Enforcement Power nor Private 
Enforcement Power is significant (columns 2 and 3, respectively).  In columns 4-6, the 
regressions include Scope  and the enforcement measures; neither Scope  nor any of the 
enforcement measures is significant.  In columns 7-9, the regressions include Sanction and the 
enforcement measures; the coefficient on Sanction is still positive and significant at the 1% level, 
while past enforcement, Enforced by 1994, is still the only significant enforcement measure 
(column 7).  Finally, in columns 10-12, I include the aggregate IT Law index  and the 
enforcement measures; the coefficient on the aggregate IT Law index  remains positive and 
significant in each of these regressions, as does the coefficient on past enforcement (column 10).  
In short, controlling for the enforcement environment does not alter the ownership results 
relative to the basic regressions in Panel A of Table 5.  Sanctions remain the dominant aspect of 
formal insider trading laws vis-à-vis ownership dispersion.   
  Panel B of Table 5 reports the results for stock price synchronicity.  In columns 1-3, I 
regress stock price synchronicity on the enforcement variables without the insider trading law 
measures.  Public Enforcement Power is negative and significant at the 5% level (column 2), 
implying that greater public enforcement power is associated with more informative stock prices.  
In contrast, neither Enforced by 1994 nor Private Enforcement Power is significant (columns 1 
and 3, respectively).  In columns 4-6, the regressions include Scope and the enforcement 
measures; the coefficient on Scope becomes insignificant (but is still negative) when I control for 
Public Enforcement Power (column 5) and none of the coefficients on the enforcement measures 
is significant.  In columns 7-9, the regressions include Sanction and the enforcement measures; 
the coefficient on Sanction  remains negative and significant, except in column 8, where it 
becomes less significant (with a p-value of 12%) when I control for Public Enforcement Power, 
which is insignificant.  Finally, in columns 10-12, the regressions include the aggregate IT Law 
index and the enforcement variables; the coefficient on the aggregate IT Law index remains 
negative and significant, except in column 11, where it becomes less significant (with a p-value 
of 11%) when I control for Public Enforcement Power, which is insignificant.    
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Panel C of Table 5 reports the results for stock market liquidity.  In columns 1-3, I 
regress stock market turnover on the enforcement variables without the insider trading law 
measures.  The coefficient on Public Enforcement Power is positive and significant at the 10% 
level (column 2), implying that greater public enforcement power is associated with more liquid 
stock markets.  In contrast, the coefficients on Enforced by 1994 and Private Enforcement Power 
are both insignificant (columns 1 and 3, respectively).
28   
In columns 4-6, the regressors include Scope and the alternative enforcement measures; 
the coefficients on Scope and the enforcement measures are all positive but insignificant.  In 
columns 7-9, the regressions include Sanction and the enforcement measures.  The coefficient on 
Sanction  remains positive and significant at the 10% level when I control for Private 
Enforcement Power (column 9).  In contrast, the coefficient on Sanction becomes insignificant 
when I control for both Enforced by 1994 (column 7) and Public Enforcement Power (column 8), 
neither of which is significant.  Finally, in columns 10-12, the regressions include the aggregate 
IT Law index and the alternative enforcement measures.  The coefficient on the aggregate IT Law 
index remains positive and significant at the 10% level when I control for Private Enforcement 
Power (column 12), but becomes slightly less significant (p-value of 11%) when I control for 
past enforcement (column 10) and completely insignificant when I control for Public 
Enforcement Power (column 11).  
Table 5 shows that the basic results are robust to controlling for past enforcement and 
private enforcement power, but not public enforcement power.  The results for stock price 
synchronicity and especially stock market turnover (but not ownership dispersion) are mitigated 
when I take into account public enforcement power.  It turns out, however, that Public 
Enforcement Power is highly correlated with Sanction (and thus with the aggregate IT Law 
index), which means that the two variables cannot really be disentangled.  This could explain 
why, in the liquidity and synchronicity regressions, each is significant without the other but both 
are insignificant when they are included together.  To address this problem, I code a new 
variable, the product of Public Enforcement Power and Sanction.
29  As Table 6 demonstrates, the 
                                                 
28   In contrast, Bhattacharrya and Daouk (2002) find that past enforcement of insider trading laws is associated 
with a positive and statistically significant increase in stock market liquidity.  The difference between their results 
and mine is not altogether surprising, however.  Because their data cover many countries over more than twenty 
years, they have a very large sample size.  The low level of statistical significance of the coefficient on Enforced by 
1994 undoubtedly results from my small sample size, which reduces the power of the statistical tests.  
29   The results are similar if I take their sum.  See SAS (1999).  
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combined measure is highly significant and trumps both Disclosure
30 and Private Enforcement 
Power in full regressions for all of the dependent variables.   
In summary, then, the basic results are robust to controlling for the enforcement 
environment.  The possibility of stringent sanctions (especially criminal sanctions), rather than 
the breadth of the prohibition, seems to be the pivotal feature of the insider trading prohibition. 
V.  DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
I find that countries with more prohibitive formal insider trading laws tend to have more 
dispersed equity ownership (H1), more informative stock prices (H2) and more liquid stock 
markets (H3), even when accounting for disclosure and enforceability. My results are consistent 
with and supplement those of Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) in that both enforceability and 
formal insider trading laws seem matter to stock market development.
31  Moreover, the most 
important aspects of the formal laws seem to be their deterrent elements, especially the 
possibility of criminal sanctions.  Thus, while Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) argue that the 
mere enactment of insider trading laws does not matter, it appears that enactment of the “right” 
laws does.
32  Finally, my results suggest some of the particular channels (i.e., greater ownership 
dispersion, liquidity, and stock price informativeness) through which effective insider trading 
regulation might lower the cost of equity (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002).  However, further 
empirical work (including case studies) covering more countries and time periods is required 
before I would confidently make policy recommendations.   
The specific mechanisms through which countries enforce their insider trading laws merit 
further study.  My legal measures do not incorporate liability rules, allocations of evidentiary 
burdens or general rules of litigation and administrative procedure, which could pose greater or 
lesser obstacles to private suits and public enforcement.  In addition, my measure of public 
enforcement power (from La Porta et al., 2003) addresses general characteristics of the securities 
market supervisor rather than supervisor characteristics specific to insider trading oversight and 
                                                 
30   I do not include Disclosure in Table 6 because it is also highly correlated with Public Enforcement Power.  
However, the results in Table 6 do not change if I include it. 
31   My data suggest that there is a strong positive correlation between the securities regulatory environment and the 
stringency of the formal laws. 
32   This supports Polinsky and Shavell (2000), who argue that a very low probability of enforcement might be 
optimal if the legal sanctions are sufficiently large.  
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enforcement.
33  I acknowledge such shortcomings and encourage further empirical study of these 
additional dimensions. 
Nevertheless, my preliminary findings arguably shed some initial light on the question 
“[w]ho should enforce a particular legal rule?” (Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer, 2001) in the 
context of insider trading.  Hay and Shleifer (1998) argue that private enforcement of public laws 
is superior to public enforcement of such laws when the state’s legal apparatus is dysfunctional.  
Consistent with the latter rationale, La Porta et al. (2003) find that private enforcement of 
securities laws governing new equity offerings is more effective than public enforcement of such 
laws.  In contrast, my findings suggest that public enforcement (especially the legal and 
institutional ability to levy criminal sanctions) is more important than private enforcement of 
insider trading laws.  This result is not surprising, since many features of insider trading render it 
more amenable to public enforcement.
34   
Two additional enforcement mechanisms that I have not considered here are self-
regulation by stock exchanges (self-regulatory organizations (SROs)) and private ordering.  On 
the one hand, via their proprietary, real-time electronic trading data, SROs might be better able to 
identify insider trading and might have greater incentives, relative to the state and private 
investors, to write and enforce securities market rules (Mahoney, 1997).  On the other hand, 
SROs might have conflicted interests (Kahan, 1997), especially if their owners/members (i.e., 
broker-dealers) are the very parties who engage in insider trading (Haddock and Macey, 1987).  
Also, spillovers (Cooter, 1996) might cause SROs to under-enforce, especially in light of market 
fragmentation (Harris, 1993).  Finally, SROs lack the police force necessary to compel 
information, capture violators and impose non-monetary sanctions, like imprisonment.
35  The 
                                                 
33    The latter data are extremely hard to get, although Herrington (2004) makes some initial strides in this direction. 
34   In particular, individual investors are unable to discern insider trading in impersonal markets and are therefore 
unlikely to exercise private rights of action, even in countries with efficient judicial systems.  As Dooley (1980) 
notes for the United States, “private actions play a trivial role in regulating insider trading; the Commission [SEC] 
has a virtual monopoly.  The private actions actually brought are largely parasitic – a condition found nowhere else 
in securities regulation.  Even with the benefit of prior SEC action, private parties are surprisingly reluctant to bring 
claims” (pp. 16-17).  Consequently, “[p]rivate suits have little deterrent effect independent of what can be produced 
at less cost by public enforcement and must be justified, if at all, on compensatory grounds” (Dooley, 1980, p. 36).  
This is consistent with Landis (1938) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000), who argue that public enforcement is 
optimal when it is too costly for the victim to identify or apprehend the perpetrator.   
35   In practice, many stock exchanges (like the NYSE) cooperate with public regulators to enforce insider trading 
rules (see, e.g., Dooley, 1980).  
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role of SROs in insider trading rulemaking and enforcement is thus an interesting question that 
merits future comparative study.
36   
Private contracting between firms and shareholders (as opposed to a mandatory 
prohibition) is another way that countries might address insider trading (see, e.g., Carlton and 
Fischel, 1983; Haddock and Macey, 1986a).  Breaches of insider trading “contracts” presumably 
would be settled in court.
37  However, since public regulation has generally supplanted any 
private ordering of insider trading,
38 this method of enforcement is not very amenable to 
empirical analysis (Cox, 1986; Easterbrook, 1985), except perhaps from an historical 
perspective.
39  Also, the preceding analysis of the relative efficacy of private and public 
enforcement of public insider trading rules applies with equal force to private ordering (Cox, 
1986; Easterbrook, 1985). 
Another issue worthy of further study is the political economy of insider trading laws.  
The public choice claim that various stakeholders in the financial system cause these laws to be 
adopted (Haddock and Macey, 1987) suggests that causality might instead run from the financial 
system to insider trading rules.
 40  (The fact that the basic results appear to be robust to changing 
the time period in which the dependent variables are measured
41 and the legal origin controls 
should partially address this critique with respect to my data, however.)   It is also possible that 
some countries enacted insider trading laws merely in response to external pressure (Haddock 
and Macey, 1986b), resulting in rote transplantation of foreign laws unrelated to the country’s 
financial, legal, and institutional characteristics (see, e.g., Pistor, 2002).  (However, my finding 
                                                 
36   Herrington (2004) is the first study I am aware of that considers SRO enforcement.  His results suggest that 
SRO enforcement is generally not strongly related to the financial variables in this study. 
37   “[I]t is not at all clear…that the current enforcement apparatus of the [SEC] is necessary to supplement in the 
common law courts the regime of private enforcement that would take place if a ‘Coasian’ system of private 
contracting were permitted to exist” (Haddock and Macey, 1986a, p. 1451). However, private ordering of insider 
trading would raise several concerns, including: difficulty of shareholders to detect breaches of insider trading 
agreements (Cox, 1986); judicial and transaction uncertainty caused by the absence of a bright line rule, which could 
pose particular problems in transition economies (Shleifer and Hay, 1998); externalities (Easterbrook, 1985); and 
potential reinforcement of undesirable social norms (Cooter, 1997; Posner, 1996; Shleifer and Hay, 1998).   
38   For example, Germany apparently had a system of private contracting prior to its adoption of a statutory insider 
trading law (Schafer and Ott, 1992). 
39    According to Easterbrook (1985), “[t]he [U.S.] historical pattern – trading until 1961, public enforcement 
thereafter – is consistent with a story that trading is efficient, but it is equally consistent with a story that public 
enforcers have a comparative advantage, aided by computers and the criminal law, in getting rid of an inefficient 
practice” (p.95).     
40   Coffee (2001) addresses this issue more generally.   
41   Herrington (2004) runs similar regressions of 2003 measures of synchronicity and liquidity using my insider 
trading indices for a larger sample of 49 countries and obtains qualitatively similar results.  
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of a significant relationship between formal insider trading laws and financial structure and 
performance suggests otherwise, at least for the countries in my sample.)  Since both 
endogeneity and irrelevance of formal insider trading laws are plausible alternatives to the story 
here, careful study of the political economy of countries’ (especially emerging markets’) 
adoption of insider trading laws would therefore be informative (see, e.g., Beny, 2002, for a 
start). 
Finally, it might be worth exploring the interaction between insider trading laws and 
business norms.  The enforceability critique of formal laws (Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer, 2000) 
notwithstanding, the rarity of enforcement (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002) might not prove non-
compliance in every context (Cooter, 1998, 2000).  From an expressive perspective, insider 
trading laws might “tip a system of social norms into a new equilibrium” (Cooter, 1998).   
Among other things, therefore, one could examine countries’ official pronouncements 
accompanying their prohibition of insider trading.  Such pronouncements (or lack thereof) might 
illuminate whether they are trying to promote the best global business norms or simply appeasing 
imperial prerogatives.  
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Table 1: Description of the Variables 
 
 Description   
 Dependent  Variables 
Ownership 
Dispersion 
 
One minus the average fraction of common stock of the ten largest non-financial domestic firms owned by 
the three largest shareholders in the country.  Source: La Porta et al. (1998).   
Stock Market 
Turnover 
The total value traded divided by stock market capitalization in 1995.  Source: International Finance 
Corporation, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook (1996). 
Stock Price 
Synchronicity 
The fraction of stocks whose prices moved in the same direction in an average week in 1995.  Source: 
Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000). 
  Insider Trading Law Variables 
Tipping  Tipping equals one if corporate insiders are prohibited from tipping outsiders (tippees) about material non-
public information and/or encouraging them to trade on such information for personal gain; equals zero 
otherwise.  Sources: Gaillard (1992); Stamp and Welsh (1996). 
Tippee  Tippee equals one if tippees, like corporate insiders, are prohibited from trading on material non-public 
information that they have received from corporate insiders; equals zero otherwise.  Sources: Gaillard (1992); 
Stamp and Welsh (1996). 
Damages Damages  equals one if the monetary penalty for violating insider trading laws is potentially greater than the 
insiders’ trading profits; equals zero otherwise.  Sources: Gaillard (1992); Stamp and Welsh (1996). 
Criminal  Criminal equals one if violation of insider trading laws is a potential criminal offense; equals zero otherwise.  
Sources: Gaillard (1992); Stamp and Welsh (1996). 
Scope  Scope is a sub-index of insider trading law.  Scope measures the breadth of the insider trading prohibition.  It 
is the sum of Tipping and Tippee.  Scope ranges from 0 to 2, with 0 representing the most permissive insider 
trading prohibition and 2 representing the most restrictive insider trading prohibition. 
 
Sanction  Sanction is a sub-index of insider trading law.  Sanction is a proxy for the expected criminal and monetary 
sanctions for violating a country’s insider trading laws.  It is the sum of Damages and Criminal.  Sanction 
ranges from 0 to 2, with 0 representing the lowest expected sanctions and 2 representing the highest expected 
sanctions. 
IT Law   The aggregate IT Law index equals the sum of (1) Tipping; (2) Tippee; (3) Damages; and (4) Criminal; or, 
equivalently, the sum of Scope and Sanction.  IT Law ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 representing the most lax 
insider trading legal regime and 4 representing the most restrictive insider trading legal regime.       
 Enforcement  Variables 
Enforced by 
1994 
A proxy for actual enforcement, Enforced by 1994 is an indicator variable that equals one if the country’s 
insider trading law has been enforced for the first time by the end of 1994.  Source: Bhattacharya and Daouk 
(2002). 
Public 
Enforcement 
Power 
The public enforcement index is the arithmetic mean of an index of the securities market supervisor’s 
characteristics and an index of the securities market supervisor’s investigative powers. 
The securities market supervisor’s characteristics index equals the arithmetic mean of the four components: 
(1) Appointment – “[e]quals one if a majority of the members of the Supervisor are unilaterally appointed by  
   
  the Executive branch of government; equals zero otherwise”; (2) Tenure – “[e]quals one if members of the 
Supervisor cannot be dismissed at the will of the appointing authority; equals zero otherwise; (3) Focus – 
“[e]quals one if separate government agencies or official authorities are in charge of supervising commercial 
banks and stock exchanges; equals zero otherwise; (4) Rules – “[e]quals one if the Supervisor can generally 
issue regulations regarding primary offerings and/or listing rules on stock exchanges without prior approval 
of other governmental authorities.  Equals one-half if the Supervisor can generally issue regulations 
regarding primary offerings and/or listing rules on stock exchanges only with the prior approval of other 
governmental authorities.  Equals zero otherwise.” 
The supervisor’s investigative powers index equals the arithmetic mean of two factors: (1) Document – “[a]n 
index of the power of the Supervisor to command documents when investigating a violation of securities 
laws.  Equals one if the Supervisor can generally issue an administrative order commanding all persons to 
turn over documents; equals one-half if the Supervisor can generally issue an administrative order 
commanding publicly-traded corporations and/or their directors to turn over documents; equals zero 
otherwise; (2) Witness – “[a]n index of the power of the Supervisor to subpoena the testimony of witnesses 
when investigating a violation of securities laws.  Equals one if the Supervisor can generally subpoena all 
persons to give testimony; equals one-half if the Supervisor can generally subpoena the directors of publicly-
traded corporations to give testimony; equals zero otherwise.” 
Source: La Porta et al. (2003)  
Private Right  Private right equals one if private parties have a private right of action against parties who have violated the 
country’s insider trading laws.  Sources: Gaillard (1992); Stamp and Welsh (1996).  
Efficiency of the 
Judiciary 
Efficiency of the judiciary is a measure of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects 
business, particularly foreign firms.”  It is recorded as the arithmetic average between 1980 and 1983.  
Source: La Porta et al. (2003).   
Private 
Enforcement 
Power 
The product of Private Right and Efficiency of the Judiciary. 
 Control  Variables 
Log of GDP  Logarithm of per capita gross domestic product in 1995, measured in constant 1995 US $.  Source: World 
Bank, World Development Report CD-Rom (2003). 
GDP Growth  Average annual percentage growth rate of per capita GDP for the years 1970-1993.  Source: World Bank, 
World Development Report (1995). 
Anti-director 
Rights 
The index is created by adding 1 if: (1) shareholders are allowed to mail their proxy votes; (2) the law does 
not require shareholders to deposit their shares before the general meeting of shareholders; (3) the law 
permits cumulative voting; (4) a mechanism for oppressed minority shareholders exists; or (5) the minimum 
percentage ownership stake that entitles a shareholder to request an extraordinary meeting of shareholders is 
less than or equal to 10% of outstanding capital shares.  The index ranges from 0 to 5, where 0 signifies the 
weakest investor protections and 5 signifies the strongest investor protections.  Source: La Porta et al. (1997).  
Legal Origin  An indicator variable that signifies the legal origin of the country’s Company Law or Commercial Code.  
Legal origin may be English common law, French civil law, German civil law or Scandinavian civil law.  
Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
Disclosure  
 
The Disclosure index equals the arithmetic average of 6 separate indices of information that firms are legally 
required to include in their prospectuses: (1) Compensation; (2) Shareholders; (3) Inside Ownership; (4) 
Irregular contracts; (5) Transactions.   
(1) Compensation is “[a]n index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the compensation of  
   
  directors and key officers.  Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the compensation of each 
director and key officer be reported in the prospectus of a newly-listed firm; equals one-half if only the 
aggregate compensation of directors and key officers must be reported in the prospectus of a newly-listed 
firm; equals zero when there is no requirement to disclose the compensation of directors and key officers in 
the prospectus for a newly-listed firm.”   
(2) Shareholders is “[a]n index of disclosure requirements regarding the Issuer’s equity ownership structure.  
Equals one if the law or the listing rules require disclosing the name and ownership stake of each shareholder 
who, directly or indirectly, controls ten percent or more of the Issuer’s voting securities; equals one-half if 
reporting requirements for the Issuer’s 10% shareholders do not include indirect ownership or if only their 
aggregate ownership needs to be disclosed; equals zero when the law does not require disclosing the name 
and ownership stake of the Issuer’s 10% shareholders.  No distinction is drawn between large-shareholder 
reporting requirements imposed on firms and those imposed on large shareholders themselves.”   
(3) Inside Ownership is “[a]n index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the equity ownership of 
the Issuer’s shares by its directors and key officers.  Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the 
ownership of the Issuer’s shares by each of its directors and key officers be disclosed in the prospectus; 
equals one-half if only the aggregate number of the Issuer’s shares owned by its directors and key officers 
must be disclosed in the prospectus; equals zero when the ownership of Issuer’s shares by its directors and 
key officers need not be disclosed in the prospectus.” 
(4) Irregular contracts is “[a]n index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the Issuer’s contracts 
outside the ordinary course of business. Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the terms of 
material contracts made by the Issuer outside the ordinary course of its business be disclosed in the 
prospectus; equals one-half if the terms of only some material contracts made outside the ordinary course of 
business must be disclosed; equals zero otherwise.” 
(5) Transactions is “[a]n index of the prospectus disclosure requirements regarding transactions between the 
Issuer and its directors, officers, and/or large shareholders (i.e., “related parties”).  Equals one if the law or 
the listing rules require that all transactions in which related parties have, or will have, an interest be 
disclosed in the prospectus; equals one-half if only some transactions between the Issuer and related parties 
must be disclosed in the prospectus; equals zero if transactions between the Issuer and related parties need 
not be disclosed in the prospectus.” 
Source: La Porta et al. (2003) 
Accounting The  accounting  index  is a measure of the quality of accounting standards.  The accounting index assigns a 
rating to companies’ 1990 annual reports on the basis of their inclusion or exclusion of 90 items.  The 90 
items are divided into 7 categories (general information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow 
statement, accounting standards, stock data and special items).  For each country, the index is based on 
examination of a minimum of 3 companies.  The companies represent a cross-section of various industries.  
Seventy percent are industrial companies, while the remaining thirty percent are financial companies.  
Source: La Porta et al. (1998).  
  
   
Table 2: Formal Insider Trading Law and Enforceability 
This table presents the formal insider trading law and enforcement measures for the 
sample countries, grouped by legal origin.  The columns contain the following variables: 
(1) Scope equals the sum of Tipping and Tippee; (2) Sanction equals the sum of Damages 
and Criminal; (3) the aggregate IT Law index is the sum of Scope and Sanction; (4) 
Enforced by 1994 equals one if the insider trading prohibition was enforced by 1994, and 
zero otherwise; (5) Public Enforcement Power is the mean of the indices of the securities 
market supervisor’s characteristics and investigative powers; and (6) Private 
Enforcement Power is the product of Private Right and the efficiency of the judiciary.  
All variables are described in detail in Table 1. The superscripts a and c denote statistical 
significance at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively.  N/A means data are not available. 
  
   
Table 2 – Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
Scope 
 
 
 
(1) 
Sanction 
 
 
 
(2) 
IT Law  
 
 
 
(3) 
Enforced 
by 1994 
 
 
(4) 
Public 
Enforcement 
Power 
 
(5) 
Private  
Enforcement 
Power 
 
(6) 
Common Law             
Australia 2.00  1.00  3.00  0  0.88  10.00 
Canada 2.00  2.00  4.00  1  0.81  9.25 
Hong Kong  2.00  1.00  3.00  1  0.75  0.00 
India 1.00  1.00  2.00  0  0.69  0.00 
Ireland 2.00  1.00  3.00  0  0.13  8.75 
Malaysia 1.00  1.00  2.00  0  0.69  9.00 
Singapore 2.00  1.00  3.00  1  0.75  10.00 
South Africa  1.00  1.00  2.00  0  0.38  6.00 
Thailand 2.00  1.00  3.00  1  0.88  0.00 
UK 2.00  1.00  3.00  1  0.63  0.00 
USA 2.00  2.00  4.00  1  1.00  10.00 
Common Law Average  1.73  1.18  2.91  0.54  0.69  5.73 
French Civil Law             
Belgium 2.00  1.00  3.00  1  0.13  0.00 
Brazil 2.00  0.00  2.00  1  0.50  5.75 
France 2.00  2.00  4.00  1  0.94  0.00 
Greece 2.00  0.00  2.00 0  0.38  0.00 
Indonesia 1.00  1.00  2.00  0  0.75  0.00 
Italy 2.00  1.00  3.00  0  0.50  0.00 
Mexico 1.00  0.00  1.00  0  0.25  0.00 
Netherlands 2.00  1.00  3.00  1  0.50  0.00 
Philippines 1.00  1.00  2.00  0  0.88  0.00 
Portugal 2.00  1.00  3.00  0  0.88  5.50 
Spain 2.00  1.00  3.00  0  0.50  6.25 
French Civil Law Average  1.73  0.82  2.55  0.36  0.56  1.59 
German Civil Law             
Austria 2.00  0.00  2.00  0  0.13  0.00 
Germany 2.00  1.00  3.00  0  0.25  0.00 
Japan 1.00  1.00  2.00  1  0.00  0.00 
Luxembourg 2.00  1.00  3.00  0  N/A  N/A 
South Korea  2.00  2.00  4.00  1  0.38  6.00 
Switzerland 2.00  1.00  3.00  0  0.25  0.00 
Taiwan 2.00  1.00  3.00  1  0.38  6.75 
German Civil Law Average  1.86  1.00  2.86  0.43  0.23  2.13 
Scandinavian Civil Law             
Denmark 2.00  1.00  3.00  0  0.38  0.00 
Finland 2.00  1.00  3.00  1  0.38  0.00 
Norway 1.00  0.00  1.00  1  0.13  0.00 
Sweden 2.00  1.00  3.00  1  0.25  0.00 
Scandinavian Civil Law 
Average 
1.75 0.75  2.50  0.75  0.28  0.00 
Civil Law Average  1.77  0.86  2.64  0.45  0.41  1.44  
   
 
 
 
 
Scope 
 
 
 
(1) 
Sanction 
 
 
 
(2) 
IT Law  
 
 
 
(3) 
Enforced 
by 1994 
 
 
(4) 
Public 
Enforcement 
Power 
 
(5) 
Private  
Enforcement 
Power 
 
(6) 
 
Overall Average  1.76  0.97  2.73  0.48  0.51  2.91 
 
 
t-test of difference in means 
(common law vs. civil law)  -0.28 
 
 
 
1.67
c 0.97
  0.48 
 
 
 
2.86
a 
 
 
 
3.33
a 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
This table presents pairwise correlation coefficients for the dependent variables, the substantive insider trading law measures 
and the enforcement measures.  All variables are described in detail in Table 1.  The numbers in parentheses are the probability 
levels (p-values) at which the null hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected in two-tailed tests.  The superscripts a, b, and 
c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
   
 
Table 3 – Continued 
 
 (1) 
Own’shp 
Dispersion 
 
(2) 
Stock Price Synchr. 
(3) 
Stock Mkt. 
Turn. 
(4) 
Scope 
(5) 
Sanction  
(6) 
IT Law 
(7) 
Enf. By 1994 
(8) 
Pub. Enf. 
(9) 
Priv. Enf. 
Dependent Variables 
 
               
(1) Ownership Dispersion 
 
1.00                
(2) Stock Price Synchronicity  -0.19 
(0.31) 
 
1.00              
(3) Stock Market Turnover  0.39
b 
(0.03) 
-0.15 
(0.42) 
1.00            
 
Insider Trading Law Measures 
 
               
(4) Scope  0.13
 
(0.47) 
 
-0.39
b 
(0.03) 
0.36
b 
(0.04) 
1.00          
(5) Sanction  0.53
 a 
(0.00) 
 
-0.37
 b 
(0.04) 
0.24 
(0.18) 
0.24 
(0.18) 
1.00        
(6) IT Law  0.44
 a 
(0.01) 
-0.48
 a 
(0.01) 
0.37
b 
(0.03) 
0.74
a 
(0.00) 
0.83
a 
(0.00) 
1.00      
Enforcement Measures 
 
               
(7) Enforced by 1994  0.52
 a 
(0.00) 
 
-0.11 
(0.55) 
0.24
  
(0.18) 
0.26 
(0.13) 
0.29
c 
(0.10) 
0.35
b 
(0.04) 
1.00   
(8) Public Enforcement Power  0.01 
(0.96) 
 
-0.28 
(0.13) 
-0.09
 
(0.60) 
0.08 
(0.66) 
0.47
a 
(0.01) 
0.38
b 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.76) 
1.00  
(9) Private Enforcement Power  0.19 
(0.28) 
 
-0.05 
(0.78) 
-0.01 
(0.96) 
0.15 
(0.40) 
0.34
c 
(0.06) 
0.32
c 
(0.07) 
0.02 
(0.92) 
0.33
c 
(0.07) 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
  
   
Table 4: Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? 
This table presents ordinary least squares regressions for the dependent variables: ownership dispersion (Panel A); stock price 
synchronicity (Panel B); and stock market turnover (Panel C).  The independent variables include the insider trading law 
variables: Scope, Sanction, and IT Law.  The control variables include: the alternative disclosure variables; anti-director rights 
(Panels A and B); legal origin dummy variables; the log of GDP per capita; and the growth of GDP per capita (in Panels B and 
C).  All variables are described in detail in Table 1.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The superscripts a, b, 
and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
   
Table 4 – Continued  
Panel A: Ownership Dispersion 
Independent  Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Scope  -0.0066
 
(0.0603) 
   0.0274 
(0.0527) 
0.0220 
(0.0643) 
    
Sanction   0.1133
a 
(0.0287) 
    0.1080
a 
(0.0401) 
0.1050
a 
(0.0316) 
  
IT Law (Scope + Sanction)     0.0642
b 
(0.0306) 
       0.0520
c  
(0.0281) 
 
0.0629
b  
(0.0296) 
Disclosure       0.2800
c 
(0.1506) 
 0.0319
 
(0.1503) 
 0.1866     
(0.1412) 
 
 
Accounting         0.0044 
(0.0034) 
 
 0.0026
 
(0.0026) 
 0.0041     
(0.0028) 
Anti-Director Rights  0.0397
b 
(0.0187) 
 
0.0291
 
(0.0182) 
0.0371
c 
(0.0196) 
0.0343 
(0.0210) 
0.0392
c 
(0.0219) 
0.0288
 
(0.0182) 
0.0295
 
(0.0207) 
0.0329  
(0.0197) 
0.0358  
(0.0223) 
French Civil Law  -0.0474   
(0.0612) 
 
-0.0279   
(0.0539) 
-0.0321    
(0.0555) 
0.0414 
(0.0919) 
-0.0021 
(0.0936) 
-0.0190   
(0.0810) 
0.0012   
(0.0819) 
0.0228   
(0.0858) 
0.0106   
(0.0865) 
German Civil Law  0.0663   
(0.0963) 
0.0814    
(0.0717) 
0.0962   
(0.0823) 
 
0.1471 
(0.0961) 
0.1187 
(0.1084) 
0.0888   
(0.0902) 
 
0.1115   
(0.0891) 
0.1375  
(0.0927) 
0.1386   
(0.0973) 
Scandinavian Civil Law  0.0476  
(0.0693) 
 
0.0995   
(0.0692) 
0.1005   
(0.0712) 
0.1353 
(0.0944) 
0.0505 
(0.0656) 
0.1058   
0.0803 
0.0966   
(0.0735) 
0.1414   
(0.0848) 
0.0956   
(0.0697) 
Log of GDP Per Capita  0.0262
 
(0.0275) 
 
0.0141
 
(0.0182) 
0.0012 
(0.0231) 
0.0214 
(0.0262) 
0.0138 
(0.0345) 
0.0151
 
(0.0193) 
0.0111
 
(0.0257) 
0.0086  
(0.0245) 
-0.0036   
(0.0305) 
Constant  0.2295
 
(0.2337) 
 
0.2323
 
(0.1805) 
0.2692 
(0.2036) 
-0.0125 
(0.2519) 
-0.0200 
(0.3673) 
0.2026
 
(0.2444) 
0.0783
 
(0.2946) 
0.0882  
(0.2544) 
0.0290   
(0.3268) 
Number of Observations  31 
 
31 
 
31 
 
31 29  31 
 
29 
 
31 29 
R
2  0.39  0.57  0.49  0.47  0.45 0.57 0.59 0.53 0.54 
  
   
Table 4 – Continued  
Panel B: Stock Price Synchronicity 
Independent  Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Scope  -2.9072
b 
(1.3337) 
   -2.7789
c 
(1.4712) 
-2.3176
c   
1.1417 
    
Sanction   -2.5627
a 
(0.9722) 
    -4.8846
a 
(1.3810) 
-3.1257
a 
(1.0273) 
  
IT Law (Scope + 
Sanction) 
   -2.2440
b 
(0.8791) 
     - 2 . 6 9 8 5
a   
(1.0177) 
 
-2.2516
b   
(0.8473) 
Disclosure       1.0351     
(4.7464) 
 13.7033
a 
(4.4974) 
 6.9757
c   
(3.8257) 
 
Accounting         0.1535
b   
(0.0693) 
 
 0.2374
a 
(0.0637) 
 0.1912
a   
(0.0569) 
Anti-Director Rights  -1.4169
b 
(0.6276) 
-1.0140 
(0.6766) 
-1.1550
c 
(0.6274) 
-1.4423
b   
(0.6059) 
-1.3121
b   
(0.4951) 
 
-1.1947
b 
(0.4756) 
-0.9485
c 
(0.5499) 
-1.3435
b   
(0.5172) 
-1.1133
b   
(0.4960) 
French Civil Law  -1.8504   
(2.3225) 
-1.8928   
(2.3607) 
-1.9994   
(2.2342) 
-1.5354   
(2.7316) 
1.0979   
(2.5937) 
 
1.9808   
(2.0350) 
1.7161   
(2.2893) 
0.0065   
(2.2036) 
1.2164   
(2.2868) 
German Civil Law  -1.1424   
(2.4054) 
-0.5711   
(2.5948) 
-1.2541   
(2.5676) 
-0.8182   
(2.6502) 
1.4428   
(2.2462) 
 
2.8303   
(1.9207) 
2.5268   
(2.1789) 
0.4358   
(2.2997) 
1.4642   
(2.2157) 
Scandinavian Civil Law  0.9137   
(2.1509) 
0.9764   
(2.0989) 
0.3177   
(2.3164) 
1.2276   
(2.3001) 
1.9887   
(2.2241) 
3.6915    
(2.1827) 
 
1.3965   
(2.2755) 
1.8103   
(2.3181) 
1.0464   
(2.3922) 
Log of GDP Per Capita  -0.7256
 
(0.6923) 
-1.2102
c 
(0.6466) 
-0.6407 
(0.7093) 
-0.7428   
(0.7012) 
-1.4517
a   
(0.5131) 
 
-0.7041
 
(0.4481) 
-1.7965
a 
(0.4613) 
-0.3458   
(0.6428) 
-1.2364
b   
(0.5447) 
Growth of GDP Per Capita  0.4739
 
(0.3892) 
0.5822
 
(0.4151) 
0.5696 
(0.4163) 
0.4720    
(0.3895) 
0.6693
c   
(0.3674) 
 
0.6578
b 
(0.3005) 
0.8159
b 
(0.3411) 
0.5771   
(0.3483) 
.7700
b   
(0.3558) 
Constant  80.2186
a 
(6.9145) 
80.7139
a 
(6.2473) 
79.5747
a 
(6.1285) 
79.3425
a   
(8.1925) 
73.495
a    
(7.6710) 
 
67.0850
a 
(5.9803) 
68.4562
a 
(4.3487) 
72.7086
a   
(6.5650) 
70.2672
a   
(4.9611) 
Number of Observations  30 
 
30 
 
30 
 
30 28 30 
 
28 
 
30 28 
R
2  0.46  0.51  0.54 0.47 0.56 0.65 0.67 0.60 0.67  
   
 
Table 4 – Continued  
Panel C: Stock Market Turnover 
Independent Variable   
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
 
(9) 
Scope   26.9504
 
(18.5936) 
   31.0102 
(18.888) 
35.2977
c 
(19.9048) 
    
Sanction   20.5811
c 
(11.7673) 
    30.8760
c 
(18.0758) 
19.1473
42 
(11.4564) 
  
IT Law (Scope + 
Sanction) 
   19.4157
c 
(10.2335) 
     20.9316
c 
(12.0507) 
 
19.2353
c    
(10.2337) 
Disclosure         31.3557 
(56.0299) 
 -58.8215 
(71.0572) 
 -21.8199 
(57.3087) 
 
Accounting         1.4338
c 
(0.7110) 
 
  0.6226    
(0.5429) 
 0.8900
c   
(0.5954) 
French Civil Law  -1.3613 
(14.1303) 
 5.3716 
(14.1536) 
4.4471 
(13.3826) 
9.8757  
(29.6645) 
16.4909 
(21.6796) 
 
-12.9811 
(28.4249) 
14.4556 
(19.3081) 
-3.0687 
(27.3983) 
16.9328 
(19.2896) 
German Civil Law   49.6448
c 
(28.5899) 
 49.4565 
(29.9006) 
53.5676
c 
(27.8088) 
59.8128
b    
(25.2840) 
67.8067
b    
(28.9938) 
 
35.1233 
(27.8449) 
57.6334
c    
(31.3980) 
47.9280
c   
(25.0427) 
64.7721
b   
(29.4608) 
Scandinavian Civil Law  -0.5551 
(13.2938) 
1.4722 
(10.7969) 
6.6676  
(13.4714) 
  10.1154 
(19.7240) 
2.4975   
(16.0194) 
 
-11.2689 
(22.7186) 
 2.7876      
(11.5944) 
1.2692 
(20.6916) 
8.2764 
(14.6858) 
Log of GDP Per Capita  2.7778
 
(7.7347) 
7.5848
b 
(3.7151) 
2.4953 
(5.0229) 
2.2211
 
(7.4208) 
-1.7813
 
(7.3606) 
5.3526   
(5.1774) 
 
6.2407 
(4.0969) 
1.5332 
(6.6947) 
0.7248 
(5.5466) 
Growth of GDP Per 
Capita 
-2.0513
 
(2.1903) 
-2.8561
 
(2.3470) 
-2.7947 
(2.3433) 
-1.9669 
(2.4136) 
-1.3550 
(2.5925) 
-3.3982 
(2.6060) 
 
 -2.3811    
(2.7061) 
-2.9070 
(2.4482) 
-2.2630 
(2.7800) 
Constant  -17.7795 
(52.8786) 
-35.6633
 
(44.3976) 
-21.6623 
(43.6627) 
-47.6604
 
(97.4333) 
-96.2524
 
(73.398) 
26.7628 
(100.02) 
 
-69.2798 
(61.0779) 
2.4070 
(95.4537) 
-71.7266 
(63.6001) 
Number of 
Observations 
31 
 
31 31 
 
31 
 
29 
 
31 29 31 29 
R
2  0.40  0.41  0.44 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.41 0.45 0.46 
 
 
 
                                                 
42   p-value of 10.9%.  
   
 
Table 5: Taking Enforceability into Account 
This table presents ordinary least squares regressions for the dependent variables: ownership dispersion (Panel A); stock price 
synchronicity (Panel B); and stock market turnover (Panel C).  The independent variables include the insider trading law 
variables: Scope, Sanction, and IT Law.  The control variables include: the actual and potential enforcement variables; anti-
director rights (Panels A and B); legal origin dummy variables; the log of GDP per capita; and the growth of GDP per capita 
(in Panels B and C).  All variables are described in detail in Table 1.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The 
superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
   
Table 5 – Continued  
Panel A: Ownership Dispersion 
Independent 
Variable 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
(11) 
 
(12) 
Scope        -0.0215   
(0.0494) 
-0.0357  
(0.0682) 
-0.0060    
(0.0611) 
 
      
Sanction             0.0990
a 
(0.0284) 
0.1331
a 
(0.0373) 
0.1165
a 
(0.0286) 
   
IT Law (Scope + 
Sanction) 
              0.0519
c  
(0.0273) 
 
0.0781
b     
(0.0330) 
0.0664
b   
(0.0307) 
Enforced by 1994  0.0936
b 
(0.0427) 
   0.0954   
(0.0432) 
   0.0675
c 
(0.0391) 
   0.0754
c  
(0.0440) 
 
  
Public Enforcement 
Power 
 
 0.0905
 
(0.0924) 
    0.1161   
(0.1008) 
   -0.0925
 
(0.1011) 
    -0.0728   
(0.0913) 
 
Private 
Enforcement 
Power 
  
   -0.0010 
(0.0088) 
    -0.0010   
(0.0090) 
   -0.0037
 
(0.0078) 
    -0.0031    
(0.0080) 
Anti-Director 
Rights 
0.0298
c 
(0.0175) 
0.0312
 
(0.0227) 
0.0409
c 
(0.0216) 
0.0285   
(0.0182) 
0.0269   
(0.0223) 
0.0406
b   
(0.0219) 
0.0231
 
(0.0168) 
0.0363
c 
(0.0211) 
0.0320
 
(0.0218) 
0.0294  
(0.0176) 
 
0.0436
c   
(0.0231) 
0.0397
c   
(0.0229) 
French Civil Law  -0.0513   
(0.0607) 
-0.0524  
(0.0612) 
-0.0494    
(0.0654) 
-0.0528   
(0.0614) 
-0.0561  
(0.0617) 
-0.0497   
(0.0667) 
-0.0334    
(0.0517) 
-0.0191   
(0.0563) 
-0.0362   
(0.0587) 
-0.0385   
(0.0562) 
 
-0.0246    
(0.0588) 
-0.0390    
(0.0605) 
German Civil Law  0.0808   
(0.0772) 
0.0944    
(0.0923) 
0.0646   
(0.1060) 
0.0743    
(0.0803) 
0.0904   
(0.0966) 
0.0629   
(0.1111) 
0.0888   
(0.0662) 
0.0571 
(0.0632) 
0.0676  
(0.0810) 
0.1009   
(0.0738) 
 
0.0813   
(0.0769) 
0.0853   
(0.0921) 
Scandinavian Civil 
Law 
0.0377    
(0.0551) 
0.0746   
(0.0685) 
0.0442   
(0.0914) 
0.0299   
(0.0597) 
0.0691   
(0.0744) 
0.0424    
(0.0971) 
0.0845   
(0.0633) 
0.0829   
(0.0692) 
0.0799   
(0.0913) 
0.0809   
(0.0633) 
 
0.0914     
(0.0716) 
0.0845   
(0.0949) 
Log of GDP Per 
Capita 
0.0095
 
(0.0212) 
0.0268
 
(0.0204) 
0.0252
 
(0.0239) 
0.0150   
(0.0260) 
0.0371   
(0.0289) 
0.0267   
(0.0297) 
0.0046
 
(0.0181) 
0.0099
 
(0.0200) 
0.0165
 
(0.0200) 
-0.0064   
(0.0222) 
 
-0.0057   
(0.0250) 
0.0027   
(0.0249) 
Constant  0.3549
 
(0.2156) 
0.1812
 
(0.2177) 
0.2293
 
(0.2366) 
0.3451   
(0.2229) 
0.1462  
(0.2345) 
0.2261   
(0.2463) 
0.3201
c 
(0.1781) 
0.2854
 
(0.1989) 
0.2173
 
(0.1834) 
0.3603
c   
(0.2015) 
 
0.3189   
(0.2174) 
0.2579   
(0.2088) 
Number of 
Observations 
31
 
 
31
 
 
31 31 31  31  31
 
 
31 31
 
 
31 31 31 
R
2  0.49  0.41  0.39  0.49  0.42 0.39 0.62 0.59 0.58 0.55 0.50 0.50 
  
   
Table 5 – Continued 
Panel B: Stock Price Synchronicity 
Independent 
Variable 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
(11) 
 
(12) 
Scope      -2.9244
b    
(1.3519) 
-1.9265   
(1.8126) 
-2.9624
b   
(1.3473) 
          
Sanction            -2.6544
b 
(1.1035) 
-2.0109
43 
(1.2476) 
-2.6516
b 
(1.0519) 
   
IT Law (Scope + 
Sanction) 
                -2.340
b   
(0.9172) 
 
-2.0673
44   
(1.2459) 
-2.3245
a   
(0.8813) 
Enforced by 1994  -0.1769
 
(1.3976) 
    0.1072   
(1.3063) 
   0.4858
b 
(1.4535) 
 
    0.6346    
(1.2337) 
  
Public Enforcement 
Power 
 
 -5.3478
b 
(2.5648) 
   -3.9459   
(3.1283) 
   -2.5011 
(3.0489) 
    -0.9170   
(3.4579) 
 
Private Enforcement 
Power  
   0.0508
 
(0.2234) 
    0.0764   
(0.2170) 
   0.1079
 
(0.2159) 
    0.1209   
(0.1995) 
 
Anti-Director Rights 
-1.2587
 
(0.6794) 
-0.7249
 
(0.7291) 
-1.3200
c 
(0.7428) 
-1.4285   
(0.6558) 
-0.9626   
(0.7680) 
-1.4850
b   
(0.7084) 
-1.0534
 
(0.7027) 
-0.8126 
(0.8067) 
-1.0974
 
(0.7601) 
-1.2135
c    
(0.6676) 
 
-1.0700   
(0.8068) 
-1.2543
c   
(0.7136) 
 
French Civil Law 
-1.6554 
(2.4639) 
-1.3480   
(2.3921) 
-1.5674     
(2.2183) 
-1.8648   
(2.4257) 
-1.5490    
(2.4005) 
-1.6882   
(2.1550) 
-1.9611   
(2.4402) 
-1.6923   
(2.5118) 
-1.6665   
(2.2999) 
-2.0924   
(2.3228) 
 
-1.9176   
(2.4453) 
-1.7491       
(2.1200) 
German Civil Law  -0.2148   
(2.4688) 
-1.8505  
(2.4211) 
-0.0064   
(2.2334) 
-1.1374   
(2.4422) 
-2.0434   
(2.4908) 
-0.8732   
(2.2551) 
-0.5366   
(2.6089) 
-1.2638   
(2.4254) 
-0.1785   
(2.4557) 
-1.2367   
(2.5747) 
 
-1.4543   
(2.4212) 
-0.8374   
(2.4457) 
Scandinavian Civil 
Law 
1.9536   
(2.1994) 
0.4691   
(2.1035) 
2.1981  
(1.7971) 
0.8867   
(2.2917) 
0.1830   
(2.2088) 
1.3143  
(1.9180) 
0.8475  
(2.1365) 
0.5013    
(2.0359) 
1.5369   
(1.9214) 
0.1249   
(2.3259) 
 
0.1952   
(2.2174) 
0.9250   
(2.1684) 
Log of GDP Per 
Capita 
-1.4764
b 
(0.6821) 
-1.6771
a 
(0.6350) 
-1.5546
b 
(0.6887) 
-0.7426   
(0.7236) 
-1.1127   
(0.7979) 
-0.7746   
(0.6966) 
-1.2975
c 
(0.6931) 
-1.3524
c 
(0.7028) 
-1.2900
c 
(0.6662) 
-0.7316   
(0.7491) 
 
-0.7376   
(0.8861) 
-0.7106   
(0.7317) 
Growth of GDP Per 
Capita 
0.4824
 
(0.4246) 
0.4509
 
(0.3999) 
0.4652
 
(0.3973) 
0.4679   
(0.4236) 
0.4574   
(0.4102) 
0.4629   
(0.4052) 
0.5591
 
(0.4376) 
0.5485 
(0.4242) 
0.5705 
(0.4186 
0.5385    
(0.4353) 
 
0.5583   
(0.4246) 
0.5557   
(0.4203) 
Constant  81.5445
 
(7.6556) 
85.2112
a 
(6.6202) 
82.1680
a 
(7.6077) 
80.4138
a   
(7.4534) 
83.2360
a   
(6.8390) 
80.6158
a   
(7.2799) 
81.6011
 
(6.8444) 
82.5223
a 
(6.4775) 
81.2793
a 
(6.4614) 
80.6896
a   
(6.7418) 
 
80.3273
a   
(6.6216) 
80.1710
a   
(6.3741) 
Number of 
Observations 
30
 
 
30
 
 
30
 
 
30 30 30 30
 
 
30 30  30 30 30 
R
2  0.40  0.48  0.41  0.47 0.50 0.47 0.51  0.52 0.52  0.55 0.54 0.55 
 
 
Table 5 – Continued  
                                                 
43   p-value of 12.2%. 
44   p-value of 11.2%.  
   
Panel C: Stock Market Turnover 
Independent 
Variable  (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Scope        26.1177   
(21.0829) 
17.2454 
(20.3102) 
27.2463 
(19.3509) 
      
Sanction             19.7731
45 
(12.1186) 
10.0731 
(11.5384) 
22.0245
c 
(12.7460) 
   
IT Law (Scope + 
Sanction) 
 
             18.9793
46 
(11.3750) 
12.9257 
(10.4570) 
20.42712
c 
(10.8154) 
Enforced by 1994  9.2013
 
(14.0127) 
    
7.5422 
(14.1537) 
   3.7740 
(14.2576) 
   2.7863 
(14.4431) 
  
Public Enforcement 
Power 
 
 55.5603
c 
(31.8653) 
   47.0251 
(34.4179) 
   42.1356 
(33.7340) 
   31.9367 
(33.0583) 
 
Private Enforcement  
Power 
 
   -0.7277
 
(1.4938) 
   -0.8370 
(1.4719) 
   -1.3313 
(1.6079) 
   -1.3695 
(1.4571) 
French Civil Law  -0.0486 
(13.5708) 
 
7.3559 
(15.2629) 
-3.2909 
(12.2868) 
-0.9308 
(14.4379) 
5.6188 
(16.4537) 
-4.5308 
(12.4419) 
5.3421 
(14.2097) 
8.3421 
(14.9276) 
0.7590   
(12.8487) 
4.4846 
(13.5546) 
7.3194   
(14.4576) 
-0.4643 
(12.1665) 
German Civil Law  46.5509 
(31.1966) 
 
69.0136
b 
(32.3192) 
39.5482 
(30.2577) 
51.9813
c 
(27.6955) 
69.0419
b 
(31.4813) 
45.2049 
(28.3108) 
50.4861 
(30.4224) 
65.7722
b 
(32.4770) 
42.7064 
(28.5226) 
54.2743
c 
(27.5510) 
64.8756
b 
(31.3890) 
46.7182
c 
(26.3694) 
Scandinavian Civil 
Law 
 
-9.5145 
(9.5399) 
13.1235 
(17.1079) 
-13.2001 
(15.8993) 
-1.5891 
(14.0109) 
14.9122 
(17.4540) 
-5.8100 
(17.9810) 
0.6849 
(10.9855) 
12.7931 
(17.2217) 
-6.3229 
(14.5588) 
6.0348 
(14.2590) 
14.0401 
(17.6501) 
-1.2813 
(16.5294) 
Log of GDP Per 
Capita 
 
8.1455
a 
(3.0651) 
11.6735
a 
(4.4322) 
10.6583
c 
(5.4826) 
1.4532 
(6.2321) 
6.7779 
(8.5399) 
3.4150 
(8.4832) 
6.9060
b   
(3.2951) 
10.0784
a 
(3.8010) 
8.5533
c 
(4.5704) 
2.0926 
(4.0410) 
5.9574 
(5.9207) 
3.2755 
(5.5698) 
Growth of GDP Per 
Capita 
 
-2.6580
 
(2.0693) 
-1.6114
 
(2.3937) 
-1.9602
 
(2.5094) 
-2.5298 
(1.9685) 
-1.6674 
(2.3665) 
-1.9188 
(2.3129) 
-3.0645 
(2.1445) 
-2.1057 
(2.4197) 
-2.7005 
(2.3573) 
-2.9550 
(2.1061) 
-2.2876 
(2.5116) 
-2.6158 
(2.3458) 
Constant -22.4006
 
(31.8967) 
-92.6610
 
(59.1352) 
-39.4033
 
(49.4607) 
-6.1335 
(38.3266) 
-71.6429 
(74.0632) 
-19.9307 
(56.6206) 
-29.5993 
(39.0809) 
-78.4720 
(52.8018) 
-39.3088 
(48.6120) 
-17.4892
c 
(35.8571) 
-58.7005 
(60.9365) 
-24.7167 
(47.8712) 
 
Number of 
Observations 
31
 
 
31
 
 
31
 
 
31  31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
R
2  0.36  0.44 0.35  0.40  0.45 0.40 0.41 0.45 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.45 
 
 
                                                 
45   p-value of 11.6%. 
46   p-value of 10.9%.  
   
Table 6 – Full Regression Models 
This table presents ordinary least squares regressions for the dependent variables: ownership dispersion (columns 1 and 2); 
stock price synchronicity (columns 3 and 4); and stock market turnover (columns 5 and 6).  The independent variables include: 
Public Enforcement Power*Sanction; Private Enforcement Power; anti-director rights; legal origin dummy variables; the log 
of GDP per capita; and the growth of GDP per capita.  All variables are described in detail in Table 1.  Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses.  The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
  Ownership  
Dispersion 
Stock Price 
Synchronicity 
Stock Market  
Turnover 
  (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Public Enforcement Power*Sanction 
 
0.0991
b 
(0.0443) 
0.1023
b 
(0.0410) 
-3.7773
a 
(1.1150) 
 
-3.9098
a 
(1.2280) 
35.7708
a 
(12.9571) 
39.3389
a 
(12.0731) 
Private Enforcement  
Power 
 
 
 
-0.0029 
(0.0083) 
 0.1140 
(0.2046) 
 -2.0432 
(1.3847) 
Accounting  0.0038 
(0.0027) 
0.0037 
(0.0029) 
0.1967
a 
(0.0596) 
 
0.1970
a 
(0.0566) 
0.8296 
(0.5852) 
0.8216 
(0.5011) 
Anti-Director Rights  Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes No  No 
Legal Origin Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes  Yes 
Log of GDP Per Capita  Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes  Yes 
Growth of GDP Per Capita  No No Yes 
 
Yes Yes  Yes 
Constant  0.0480 
(0.3186) 
0.0412 
(0.3173) 
70.9056
a 
(3.9095) 
71.4369
a 
(3.9345) 
-89.0423 
(55.7175) 
-93.7257
c 
(53.5822) 
Number of Observations   
29 
 
29 
 
28 
 
 
28 
 
29 
 
29 
R
2  0.54 
 
0.54 0.67 0.68  0.50  0.52 
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